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This paper sho'~"s that, under tf}e ·usual assumptions of the Hecksher­
Ohlin-S"amuelson nlodeL extensivaly used in the pure theory of international 
trade, free trade can be seen as the soiution to a Nash" c90perative game. The 
. question of free or fair trade is then' related to different admissible solution 
concepts to a two person cooperative game. 
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Ir{rRODUCTI()t~ 
The standard approach to the pure theory of international trade 
assunles~ in its utmost sinlplicity and beauty, that countries can be described by 
endowments of factors of production! usually assumed to be capital and labor, 
technology rel-ating the use of factors' and the output of two goods, and the I 
preferences of nationals of each country. these being defined over different 

.consumption bundles. Under autarchy each country produces efficiently, and 
 I 
.any difference in factor endo"~m'ents, technologies or' tastes will result in I 
different autarchy relative prices for the goods produced. Any such difference 
. 	 ­
can. ~hen be exploited, and as the factors of production, capital and labor are 

assumed to be mobile \vithin eacQ country. but not between both countries. the 

exchange of goods produced (international trade). is t~e on~}' avenue left in thi~ 
 I 
.\ 	 endeavor. Once it is established. and a world relativ:e-
/ 
price. for the goods 
. 
produced is found. one g'oes\on to prove that under the same conditions. both l
II 
trading partners benefit from this situation. Trade is not usually caused by a 
strategic beh,~vior, but rather, by the casual observation that there are 1 
differences in both partners that can be exploited for their mutual benefit. As a· Iresult, when t\VO countries of equal dimension are considered. in the absence of 
tariffs and quotas. the outcome of this process is usually called a free trade 
solution. 
In the traditional approach. the cooperative behavior that a free trade 
solution fnay entail is totally ignored. After all, it has been long known within 
the profession that it takes two to tango, and the autarchy point is always 
available for any trading partner. One can then ask if free trade can be arrived 
-at after a strategic behavior is adopted by each country, a question that appears . 
-
never to have been explicity spelled out in the literature. Our main point here is 
that, under the usual assumptions that are made in the standard Hecksher­
Ohlin-Sanluelson modeL frl~e trade can be seen as a solution to a cooperative 
ganle played by the t\"vO countries. Under this ~pproach' fr~e trade may be seen 

as the consequence of SOOle differ;ence' bet\veen the t\yo countries, but is arriv~d 

at after some rules, (which nlust be' obeyed by t,he solution to their cooperative 

. approach to the joint welfare maximization), are agreed upon by the t\\'"o 
players, (the 't\VO countl~ies). 
The re!nainder of the paper will proceed as follows. Section 1 '\1lill show 
.that, under the usual assumptions of the Hecksher-Ohlin-S.amuelson model freeI 
,trade can be seen as the solution to 'a Nash cooperative ga'me 1 that is played by 

both countries, Section I I will be devoted to the discussion of some other 
 I 
possible Qutcom.es of a cooperative game played by the two countries, and relate 
them the ongoing arguments on free and fair trade. Section III will present a 
brief summary of the Inain conclusions presented here. 
/ 
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iL FREE TRADE AS THE OUTCOME OF A COOPERATIVE GAME. I 
\Ve will assu me in this section that the usual assu mptions characterizing I I 
the Hecksher-Ohlin-Sanl uelson model are satisfied. There are two countries, A 
and B, t\VO factors of production, capital (K) and labor (L) and 1'\1l0 goods being 
produced in each country, good X and good Y, the technology of production being. 
the sanle in each country. Consu mers have preferences that are specified by an 
ordinal utility function, U (C~ , C~) and V (C~ , ~) being, respectively, the utility 
function of a As and Bs representative consumer, where cl is the consumption 
of good i-X,Y in country j-AIB. 
1 Nash's solution of a· two-perS(ln cooperative game is consist~nt with four axions: i) group 
rationality; ii) Vnn-Neuman-Mol'genstern invariance or-utility indicators; iii) Sy,mmetry 
of players: iv) Independence of irrelevant alterna.tives. (See Nash.·1953. Friedma.n. 1986) 
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Given the endO\Vn1ents of capital an~ labor,' each economy will be 
producing on its production possibility frontier. \vith. the meaning that for a~y t 
I 
lfeasible 'production of good X the maximum fe.a~ible anlount of good Y is being 
- produced. Let 
t 
t 
OA - v f ()-A) V "'0 (.1 ) t '< X - •.. ',; y / I • < 0, y < 
(2) f 
t 
-
be, respectively, the production possibility frontier of country A and country B, I, 
assuining that the technology of production and the factor en.dowments in each i
country are given: and where Q~ IS the maximum amount of}ood X produced: 
. / 

given-that the amount Q~7 of good Yis being prodl!.ced:w¥~e j-A.B . 

.\ 
The possibility of trade allows domestic consumption of any good to be Idifferent [roal domestic production of the good. Thus, 'Vlhen trade is allowed for, Ii 
I 
we haye that I 
(4) 
CB x = Q
B 
x + !v! (5) 
(6) 
where IV! stands for the amOiJnt traded of good X and E stands for the amount 
traded of good Y. E(~uutions (3), (4), (5) and (6) have t.he usual meaning that, 
5 
once trade is allo\Ved. consunlption of any good in any country is equal to 
dOll1estic production plus impor.ts or minus exports of the satne good. The 
requirenlcnt that, at the world relative price, trade must be balanced can be 
, expressed by 
E p!vI == 0 	 (7) 
meaning that, at \vorld relative prices, P, exports and inlports balance: 
In autarchy each country. produces and consume's so that the domestic 
Inarginal rate of sU.bstitution in consumption equals the domestic marginal rate 
of s~bstitution in production, the autarchy price level prevailing in country A 
and B being deter D1ined by this relation. As autarchy is always a possibl~ 
reginle, the utility levels associeted with the no trade situation for countries A 
. ~/ 
.\ and B'ure the natural threat points of the Nash cooperati,(;e game. Giver.. that we' 
I ' 
are U,ssu ming cardinal utility\ functions, we take the utility levels associated "\ttith 
the autarchy situation as being zero. 
It is \videly t:now that under the Nash: cooperative behavior the solution 
to the galne can be found by the cooperative maxinlization of the product of the 
utility gains accrued to each player, these being measured from its threat point. 
Once that both players adopt the Nash behavior for t11e cooperative trade ganle t 
. the solution can be found by: 
Max U (C;. C~) V (C~ .~) 	 (8) 
subject to the restrictions imposed by (l) to (7). As it is shown in the appendix, 
the solution to this problem can be characterized by the following conditions: 
(9) 
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\vhere IvIRSi and IvlRTj are., respect~velYt the marginal rate of substitution in 

consumption and the marginal rate of transformation in production in country 

j=A,B. \Vhat we have obtained in (9), taking into account that (7) is satisfied, are·, 

the conditions characterizing a free trade solution, meaning that the outcome of 

a cooperative Nash bargaining game between two countries, when balanced 

. 	 trade is allo\ved, is the free trade solution. This res1:1lt can be most .easily 
interpreted if we take into account the analysis developed 'by Roth (Roth, 1977). 
This a.uthor has shown that, under the conditions we have required for the 
. 
bargaining game between the two countries, the result of the game will be 
Pareto optimal. The pure theory of international trade has been telling us that 
free' trade is, from the \vorld point of· view, a particular Pareto optimal 
(Bahg\vati and Srinivasan, 1986). Given the restrictions we are imposing on the 
"" 
ganle,. the outcC?me will be a Pareto optilllunl, with the ad/dftional property that 
! 
trade \vill be balanced. T~le result follows in an obvious way. 
II. 	TRADE - FREE OR FAIR? 
The last section may shed some light upon a discussion that seems to· be 
in the order of the dllY. Should trade be seen as free trade or as fair trade? Once 
\ve have established that, under some very mild and usual assu mptions, free 
trade can be seen as the Nash solution to a cooperative game played by the two 
. . 
countries, \vhy should the Nash solution be the one agreed) upon by both trading 
partners? It is widely known that some other solutions have been proposed as a 
solution to a cooperative two person game, The Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky
. . 
solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975) and the minimal expectations solution 
(Friedman 1986) can be given as examples of different solution concepts -that 
are perfectly plausible to generate outcomes for the cooperative game that the 
existence of trade implies. Any solution to the game that will result from the 
7 
I 
cOlnnl0n adop:ion of playing rules; that are different from. the ones 
characterizing the Nash solution, may viola~e some of- the conditions 
characterizing this one. meaning that some optimafity condition related to- a . 
world\vide Pareto optinlU111 situation, accompanied by balanced trade, may be 
violated. In this \vay both countries, -by common agreement over a set of 
bargaining rules, may be disposing of the free trade solutiOn, as the outcome of 
the trade game Inay be different from this situatio1).. The question of free or f.air 
trade is not passe (Krugnlan, 1987). Rather it can then be transposed to what 
t 
kind of zolutiGn concept is adopted as the 'Solution to the cooperative game 
which is played by the two trading partners. In this way fair~ess will not be a 
characteristic of the trading pattern that is arrived at, but rather, a property of I 
the rules of the cooperative game \vhich 
before the actual play has taken place, as 
ganlt~. 
IlL CONCLUSiONS 
are agreed upon by both countries 
..; Ithese determin~/the outconle of the 
/ 
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S' 
I n this paper it was show~ that free trade can be seen as the result of a 
Nash cooperative game played by two countries, these being characterized as in 
the standard pure theory of international trade. The question of free or fair 
trade was also touched upon, and it was pointed out that, in the light of the 
previous result fairness should not be seen as a property of the trading pattern, 
but rather, as a property of the rules which the solution of the cooperative game 
nlust obey 
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APPENDIX 
. The lagrangean corresponding to the non-linear optimization of (8) in the 
rnain t~xt, subject to the restriction (1) to (7), can be written as: 
t'I 11 ( ... ACA) \' , ..BCB) ') (CA 'QA 'E) ~ (C' A 'OA M)
h "" ..) ,C X I y' lex I Y' + ,. 1 ' x - x + , + f'. ~ Y - 'I. Y - 1 +. 
.Partial differentiation of (A 1 ) Jeads to 
o"e . B B· aU A B. 
-A := V (CXlCyJ ~ (Cx.CyJ ~ 1'-1 = 0 
aex . acx 
a,,€ '. B B au A A .A ~ v (cx,e)) A (Cx,Cy ) -!- i.. 2 = 0 
dey oCy 
aJ. A A av B B 
",B = U (CxICy) 13 (ex ICy) + A3 = o. ac ' 'vC 
x x 
a;. ~ A A " aV B B 13 "" u (ex ICy) B (cx.e ) + A4-0.y
acoCy y 
a..e 
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(AI) 
.,I 
~/ 
I 
I 
(A2) 
I 
(A3) 
(A4) 
(AS) 
! 
(A6) 
I 
LA7) I 
I 
I 
1 
(AS) 
(A9) 
(AlO) . 
(A 11) 
a,~ 
-= - A7 rvl = 0 (A12)ap I 
The partial derivatives of the lagrangean relative to the lagrange
. , 
nlultipliers are. just the restrictions. Assuming an interioyF/ solution, incomplete 
I 
specialization and trade, .IV1 \vill be diffrent from zero so' that A 7-0, from tA 12). 
. . . \ . . I 
It follo"\vs from (A 1 0) and LA 11 ). 
I 
f 
. (A13) 
. f 
Dividing. (A3) by (A2). (AS) by (A4). (A7) by (A6) and (A9) by (A8). it 
can be found that I 
----­ = = - y' = '1'1 
proving (9) in the nlain texL 
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